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How A BILL DOES NOT BECOME A LAW:
THE SUPREME COURT SOUNDS THE DEATH KNELL OF
THE LINE ITEM VETO
Clinton v. City of New York
524 U.S. 417 (1998)
.Stephen Kennedy*
"If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different
role in determining the final text of what may 'become a law,' such change must
come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set forth in
Article V of the Constitution."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to remedy the all too common legislative practice of stuffing major
tax and appropriations bills with "pet-project dollars" and "pork," Congress
passed the Line Item Veto Act, giving the President the power to eliminate waste-
ful spending provisions within legislation.2 It is interesting to note that even
though former President Ronald Reagan espoused the most recent advocacy of
the line item veto as a presidential check on Congress, it was President Bill
Clinton who signed it into law and first used it.
The United States Supreme Court declared the Line Item Veto Act3 unconstitu-
tional on June 25, 1998, in its six to three decision in Clinton v. City of New
York." After determining that the plaintiffs had "standing" to challenge the Act,
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that the Line Item Veto Act'
violated the express language of the Constitution's Presentment Clause.6
Billed as the most exciting and anticipated case of the Court's last term,"
Clinton actually provided the Supreme Court with its second opportunity to
adjudge the vitality of the line item veto. Previously, in Raines v. Byrd,' the
Court held that the plaintiff legislators challenging the Line Item Veto Act'
lacked standing. Based on the Court's decision in Clinton, declaring the Act
unconstitutional, the line item veto's reemergence for the enjoyment of any future
President is unlikely unless Congress comes up with a constitutionally viable
form of reincarnation.
*J. Stephen Kennedy is a Law Clerk to the Honorable Tom S. Lee, Chief Judge, Southern District of
Mississippi; J.D. 1999, Mississippi College School of Law, Magna Cum Laude; B.A., Mississippi College,
Summa Cum Laude. The author would like to thank Professor Matthew Steffey for his guidance and input in
writing this case note.
1. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998); cf U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorton, 514 U.S.
779, 837 (1995).
2. See Jeff Bleich et al., A Term About Something, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19 (1998).
3. 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1996).
4. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
5. Id.
6. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
7. Bleich, supra note 2, at 19.
8. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
9. 2 U.S.C. § 691.
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1I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Less than two months after the Court's decision in Raines,"° President Clinton
used the line item veto power to cancel § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997,"1 and § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.12 The President's actions
led to the filing of Clinton v. New York. 3 To understand the reasoning behind
this action, a discussion of the relevant statutes is necessary.
A. President Clinton ' Use of the Line Item Veto Act
1. Section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act
Title XIX of the Social Security Act"4 grants the federal government authority
to funnel large sums of money to the states to help them care for the indigent."5
In 1991, Congress decided that those state grants should be reduced by the sum
of certain taxes garnered from health care providers within the states.1" In 1994,
the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter "HHS") notified the
state of New York that fifteen of its taxes fell under the 1991 Act, thus putting
New York $955 million in debt to the federal government.1 7 New York's applica-
tion for a waiver was not acted on in any year leading up to the President's
action. By March of 1997, New York owed the United States $2.6 billion. 8
In § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress attempted to aid
New York and alleviate its debt by providing that the disputed taxes were
"'deemed to be permissible health care related taxes and in compliance with the
requirements"' of the 1991 statute. 9 Unfortunately for New York, on August 11,
1997, the President exercised the line item veto and canceled § 4722(c) in order
to reduce the federal budget deficit, and also because it gave New York favored
treatment over other states."
2. Section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act
Through § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress amended § 1042
of the Internal Revenue Code in an effort to allow owners of certain food proces-
sors and refiners to defer the recognition of gain after selling their stock to eligi-
ble farmers' cooperatives.' By amending § 1042, Congress intended to "facili-
10. Raines, 521 U.S. 811.
11. Pub. L. No. 105-33.
12. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998).
13. Pub. L. No. 105-34.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b).





20. Id. at 423.
21. Id. at 424.
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tate the transfer of refiners and processors to farmers' cooperatives." '2
Importantly, § 968 was specifically identified in the Act as "subject to the line
item veto."23
President Clinton canceled § 968 on the very same day that he canceled the
provision favoring New York's health care programs.2 The President based this
decision on his belief that the provision lacked any safeguards, and that it failed
to narrowly target smaller cooperatives.s
B. The Case
Two separate suits were filed as a result of the President's action. 6 The City of
New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing
health care employees comprised the plaintiffs in the first suit.2 ' In the second
suit, the plaintiffs included a farmers' cooperative, made up of thirty potato
growers from Idaho, and an individual farmer, Mike Cranney, who was a mem-
ber and officer of the cooperative. 8 The two suits were consolidated and heard
before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district
court determined that the plaintiffs had standing under Article III of the
Constitution. 9
Appellee New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation (hereinafter
"NYCHHC"), responsible for operating public health care facilities throughout
the city, would have been forced to pay the state of New York retroactive tax pay-
ments totaling approximately $4 million for each year in issue had HHS denied
the state's waiver requests." Section 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 quashed this burden; however, the burden was reinstated when President
Clinton "lined" it out of the Act. 1 The District Court ruled that the cancellation
of the statutory relief of tax liability constituted sufficient injury to NYCHHC to
give it Article III standing. 2
Appellee Snake River Potato Growers, Inc. was formed to help Idaho potato
farmers market their crops and stabilize prices by purchasing processing facili-
ties so that the members of the cooperative could keep revenues otherwise
payable to third party processors.3 At the time of the veto, Snake River actively
planned to take advantage of Congress' proposed amendment to § 1042 of the
Internal Revenue Code. In fact, Mike Cranney was engaged in negotiating the
purchase of a processor that would have qualified under § 968 if the President
had not cancelled it. Snake River was also actively considering other purchases
22. H.R. REP. No. 105-148 pt. at 420 (1997).
23. TITLE XVII § 1701 (1997); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 425.





29. Id. at 425-26.
30. Id. at 426; City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F Supp. 168, 172 (D.D.C. 1998).
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in the event that the Court reversed the cancellation." The district court held that
the Snake River plaintiffs had suffered injury because they "lost the benefit of
being on equal footing with their competitors and (would] likely have to pay
more to purchase processing facilities now that the sellers [would] not be able to
take advantage of [§] 968's tax breaks"
3
,
Ultimately, the district court held that the President's use of the line item veto
violated the Constitutional requirements for lawmaking in two respects. 7 First,
the President's action resulted in two laws different from the laws originally
passed by Congress.' Second, the President acted in direct violation of Article I
"when he unilaterally canceled provisions of duly enacted statutes."3 The dis-
trict court also held that the Line Item Veto Act violated the separation of powers
among the three branches of government."'
The parties petitioned the Supreme Court to expedite review under § 692(b) of
the Act. This section authorized a direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any
order of the district court."' The Court granted the motion of the parties to expe-
dite review.
2
III. HISTORY OF THE APPLICABLE LAW
A. The Line Item Veto and the Line Item Veto Act
Since 1870, many Presidents have requested that Congress grant them some
type of line item veto power." Several of these Presidents simply saw the line
item veto as a method to shift the balance of power in spending decisions from
Congress to the Executive." In 1938, the House of Representatives actually
voted to give line item veto authority to the President via federal statute; howev-
er, the line item veto provision was left out of the final version of the bill.'" The
line item veto buzz was revived in 1984 with the Senate's unsuccessful attempt to
enact a statute requiring all appropriations bills to be broken down into separate
bills covering individual items.' 6
Heightened interest in the line item veto existed through the 1980's, and into
the 1990's, especially with the growing federal debt.'7 For example, the Ninety-
ninth Congress proposed at least ten different constitutional amendments to grant
line item veto authority to the President.' Those serving in the executive branch
35. Id. at 426-27.
36. Id. at 427 (quoting City ofNew York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 177 (D.D.C. 1998).
37. ld.
38. City of New York, 985 F. Supp. at 178.
39. Id. at 179.
40. id.
41. 2 U.S.C. § 692(b).
42. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
43. Senator Robert C. Byrd, The Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARV. J. ON LEors. 297,
326 (1998).
44. Id.
45. Michael G. Locklar, Is the 1996 Line Item Veto Constitutional?, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1161, 1163-64 (1997)
(citing Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, How Successfully Can the States' Item Veto be Transferred to the
President?, 75 GEO. L.J. 159, 159-60 & n.4 (1986); 83 CoNG. REc. 355-56 (1938).
46. Locklar, supra note 45, at 1164 (citing Fisher & Devins, supra note 45, at 159-60 & n.7).
47. Locklar, supra note 45, at 1164.
48. Id. at 1164-65 (citing Fisher & Devins, supra note 45, at 160 n.8).
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during the eighties and nineties were great advocates of the line item veto.' 9 The
latest push for the line item veto began in 1993 through the efforts of several
Senators who offered an amendment to the Impoundment Act, "[which pro-
posed] to break provisions in appropriations bills into separate bills, one for each
line item."'
Senator Bob Dole made the final proposal for the line item veto, which was
passed by Congress as a mechanism to control deficit spending."1 Enacted into
law on January 1, 1997, the Line Item Veto Act 2 was intended to amend and
enhance Title X of the Impoundment Act, which authorized the President to defer
spending appropriations during a fiscal year labeled by Congress as permissive
rather than mandatory.5 3
The Line Item Veto Act' provided that the President could "cancel in whole,"
within five working days after signing a bill into law, "(1) any dollar amount of
discretionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any
limited tax benefit."55 The Act defined a "dollar amount of discretionary budget
authority" as "the entire dollar amount of budget authority that is specified in the
text of an appropriations law or found in tables, charts, or the explanatory text of
statements or committee reports accompanying a bill."5" The Act defined an
"item of new direct spending" as "a provision that will result in an 'increase in
budget authority or outlays' for entitlements, food stamps, or other specified pro-
grams."5 The Act further defined a "limited tax benefit" as a "revenue losing
provision that gives tax relief to 100 or fewer beneficiaries in any fiscal year, or a
tax provision 'that provides temporary or permanent transitional relief for ten or
fewer beneficiaries in any fiscal year."' An item of new direct spending or a
limited tax benefit would have "no legal force or effect" if canceled via the line
item veto. 59
In order to exercise the veto, the Act required the President to submit a "special
message" to Congress, within five calendar days after signing a bill, detailing the
provision that had been cancelled out of the bill."' The Act only allowed the
President to exercise his cancellation power if it would "(i) reduce the Federal
budget deficit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not
harm the national interest."" Upon Congress receiving the special message, a
cancellation would go into effect.62
49. Locklar, supra note 45, at 1165 (citing President's Statement on Signing the Line Item Veto Act, 32
WEEKLY COMP. PPEs. Doc. 637 (Apr. 15, 1996) (noting the support of Presidents Grant, Reagan and Bush for
the line item veto)).
50. Locklar, supra note 45, at 1166 (citing 139 CONG. REc. S7901 (daily ed. June 24, 1993)).
51. Locklar, supra note 45, at 1166.
52. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (1996).
53. 2 U.S.C. § 681 (1974); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
54. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (1996).
55. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a).
56. 2 U.S.C. § 691(e)(7); City of New York v. Clinton, 985 E Supp. 168, 170 (D.D.C. 1998).
57. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691(e)(5), (e)(8); City of New York, 985 E Supp. at 170.
58. 2 U.S.C. § 691(e)(9); City of New York, 985 F Supp. at 170.
59. 2 U.S.C. § 691(e)(4)(B).
60. 2 U.S.C. § 691a(c)(1).
61. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(3)(A).
62. 2 U.S.C. § 691b(a).
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To reinstate a canceled item, Congress could pass a "disapproval bill," which
was not subject to the line item veto.' The Act stated, "[i]f a disapproval bill is
enacted into law, the President's cancellation is nullified and the canceled item
becomes effective.""4 However, the disapproval bill would have to comply with
the Constitutional requirements of Article I, section 7.65 If the President were to
veto the disapproval bill, it would be sent back to Congress for a possible veto
override, contingent upon a two-thirds majority vote in both Houses."
B. The Presentment Clause and Chadha
In the section commonly known as the Presentment Clause, the Constitution
states,
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to the House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent . . to the other House ... and if approved by two thirds of that House, it
shall become a Law."7
The leading case on the Supreme Court's interpretation of a violation of the
Presentment Clause is INS v. Chadha.6 8 In Chadha, the Court held that the
House of Representatives' unilateral decision to veto the deportation of an illegal
immigrant was unconstitutional because the House failed, as required by the
Constitution, to submit the decision to the Senate or the President.6 ' As the
underlying principle for their decision that "repeal of statutes, no less than enact-
ment, must comport with Article I,'"" the Court stated, "[w]ith all the obvious
flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better
way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the
carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the Constitution.""
The Chadha Court noted that only four provisions in the Constitution give
explicit authority for one House of Congress to act alone:
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. City of NewYork v. Clinton, 985 F Supp. 168, 171 (D.D.C. 1998).
66. Locklar, supra note 45, at 1175; See H.R. REP. No. 104-11, pt. I, at 8 (1995); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
67. U.S. COtsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
68. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
69. See id.
70. Id. at 954.
71. Id. at 959.
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(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the power to initiate impeach-
ment. Art. I, § 2, cl. 5;
(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials following impeach-
ment... and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 6;
(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power to approve or to disap-
prove Presidential appointments. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2;
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties .... Art.
II, § 2, cl. 2.72
Because the House's action was not authorized by any of the four provisions, the
Court viewed it as subject to the Presentment Clause." The Court recognized
that the one-House veto was an easy shortcut, but stated, "it is crystal clear from
the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings, and debates that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency." There is no support in the
Constitution ... for the proposition that.., explicit constitutional standards may
be avoided, either by the Congress or the President."
C. Standing
The Constitution permits the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to extend only
to actual "cases . . . and ... controversies." 8 To meet this standard, a case must
be justiciable, which requires that a plaintiff have standing to bring a suit before
the Court. To have standing, Article III requires that a plaintiff suffer an injury in
fact, that the injury is traceable to the defendant, and that the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action."
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization78 is a leading case on
standing, in which the plaintiffs, indigent persons and an organization set up to
help the poor, brought suit against the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter
"IRS") over a ruling that reduced the amount of charitable care that hospitals
must provide in order to qualify for tax-exempt status. ' 9 Though the plaintiffs
had applied for the benefit/service that was reduced by the IRS's ruling, the
Court held that the indigent persons lacked standing." In deciding that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to challenge the governments' tax treatment of a third party,
the Court reasoned, "[it is] purely speculative whether the denials of service...
fairly can be traced to the [IRS's] 'encouragement' or instead result from deci-
sions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications, [and] equally
72. Id. at 955.
73. Id. at 956-57.
74. Id. at 958-59.
75. Id. at 959 (citation omitted).
76. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
77. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
78. 426 U.S. 26(1976).
79. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 42-43.
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speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial powers in this
suit would result in the availability to respondents of such services."81
Similarly, in Allen v. Wright,82 the Supreme Court denied standing to the par-
ents of black public school children who challenged an IRS tax exemption aimed
at racially discriminatory private schools.' The injury alleged by the parents
involved easier access for white children to attend private schools thus making
public schools less diverse. The Court held that the injury was not "fairly trace-
able" to the IRS's action.8 ' Also, it was "entirely speculative" to conclude that
discriminatory private schools would change their practices in response to the
withdrawal of a tax exemption.85
The Supreme Court granted standing to the plaintiffs in Bryant v. Yellen,"8 a
case that centered on whether the application of a rule that limited water deliver-
ies from reclamation projects to only 160 acres under single ownership, applied
to the considerably larger tracts of the Imperial Irrigation District in southeastern
California.87 Application of the rule would have given large landowners an
incentive to sell any excess property at prices well below the fair market value
for irrigated land." Farmers who had planned to buy the excess land appealed
the decision of the district court, holding that the rule did not apply, to the
Supreme Court.s1 The Court said that even if it decided to reverse the judgment
of the lower court, the farmers "could not with certainty establish that they would
be able to purchase excess lands."8" Nevertheless, the Court granted standing
because of the likelihood that "excess lands would become available at less than
market prices.""1
Raines v. Byrd 2 was the first Supreme Court challenge to the line item veto
and is one of the more recent Supreme Court cases to have been dismissed based
on a lack of standing. 3 Acting under the authority granted by §§ 692(a)(1)
through 692(b) of the Line Item Veto Act,9" four Senators and two House mem-
bers filed suit alleging that the line item veto was unconstitutional. 5 The district
court agreed,98 but the Supreme Court overruled and declined to reach the merits
of the case. The Court held instead that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
the Act. 7 Standing was denied because "the plaintiffs did not allege a sufficient-
ly concrete injury." The Court found that the plaintiffs "alleged no injury to
themselves as individuals," and "the institutional injury alleged [was] wholly
abstract and widely dispersed."98
82. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 757.
85. Id. at 758.




90. Id. at 367.
91. Id. at 368.
92. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
93. Id.
94. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (1996).
95. Byrd v. Raines, 956 F Supp. 25, 27 (D.D.C. 1997).
96. Byrd, 956 F Supp. at 38.
97. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 830.
98. Id. at 829.
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D. Constitutionality of Congress 'Delegation of "Cancellation"
Authority to the President
In Field v. Clark,99 the Supreme Court held the Tariff Act of 1890 to be in com-
pliance with the Constitution."' The Act set out a list of nearly 300 specific arti-
cles to be exempted from import duties "unless otherwise specifically provided
for.' 10 ' Section 3 of the Act authorized the President to suspend the exemption
for coffee, tea, sugar, molasses and hides "'whenever, and so often' as he should
be satisfied that any country producing and exporting those products imposed
duties on the agricultural products of the United States that he deemed to be 'rec-
iprocally unequal and unreasonable.""'1 2 In holding that the Act was not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President in violation of
the Presentment Clause, the Court explained that
[n]othing involving the expediency or the just operation of such legislation was
left to the determination of the President. [W]hen he ascertained the fact that
[unreasonable] duties were imposed [on] the products of the United States by a
country.., it became his duty to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension,
as to that country, which Congress had determined should occur. He had no dis-
cretion ... except in respect to the duration of the suspension so ordered. As the
suspension was absolutely required when the President ascertained the existence
of a particular fact ... in obedience to the legislative will.' 2
Nearly a century later, the Court's decision in Train v. City of New York""
"implicitly confirmed that Congress may confer discretion upon the executive to
withhold appropriated funds, even funds appropriated for a specific purpose."' 5
Train dealt with a statute that permitted spending "not to exceed" specific sums
for certain projects of the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter
"EPA").' 8 The President instructed the EPA'S director to allot only a portion of
the full amount authorized for the EPA projects covered in the statute, rather than
the full amount authorized.0 7 However, the Court held that the statue required
the allotment of the full amount authorized to the projects and did not give the
President express discretion to withhold any portion of the designated funds."'
The Court examined the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 °9 in Bowsher v. Synar."' This Act
authorized the President to cancel certain items of spending and required the
President to issue a sequestration order mandating spending reductions if the fed-
99. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
100. 26 STAT. 567 (1890).
101. 26 STAT. 567, 602.
102. 26 STAT. 567, 612; Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (quoting Field, 143 U.S. at 680).
103. Field, 143 U.S. at 693.
104. 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
105. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 468.
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1285 (1976).
107. Train, 420 U.S. at 40.
108. Id. at 44-47.
109. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-902 (Supp. HI1 1982).
110. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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eral budget deficit exceeded a certain amount, a determination that was to be
made by the Comptroller General, an executive branch officer."' The sequestra-
tion order was to have the effect of permanently canceling certain budget
amounts.' 2 The Court, though, held the Act unconstitutional because the
Comptroller General, whom Congress had the power to remove, had the "ulti-
mate authority to determine the budget cuts to be made," not because the delega-
tion of legislative power to the President was ill-founded. '13 Further, "the
Bowsher Court did not hold that vesting such power in an executive officer was
unconstitutional as such.""' On the contrary, the Court held that the Comptroller
General could not constitutionally exercise this power because the Comptroller
General was not executive enough." 5 The Bowsher decision "almost conclusive-
ly stands for the proposition that a statute delegating discretionary budget cutting
authority delegates executive powers." '
IV INSTANT CASE
A. Justice Stevens 'Majority Opinion
(oined by Rehnquist, C.J, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ)
1. Standing
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, discounted the government's argu-
ment that both groups of plaintiffs in the case lacked standing to challenge the
Line Item Veto Act because they were not sufficiently and actually injured. "7
The injury to the New York plaintiffs, despite the fact that HHS had not acted on
the state's waiver requests, was not speculative because the President's action left
them with a multi-billion dollar contingent liability and deprived them of the
benefits of § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act." ' The majority stated that
"[t]he revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly affects
the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential
obligor.""' 9
On the same note, the majority articulated three points in support of the imme-
diate injury to the Snake River plaintiffs as a result of the President's cancellation
of § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act. 2 First, § 968 was designed to benefit a spe-
cific group of potential purchasers of a defined category of assets.' 2 ' Second, the
111. 2 U.S.C. §902.
112. 2 U.S.C. § 902(a)(4).
113. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986).
114. H. Jefferson Powell & Jed Rubenfeld, Laying it on the Line: A Dialogue on the Line Item Vetoes and
Separation of Powers, 47 DuLE L.J. 1171, 1198 (1998).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 430 (1998).
118. Id. at 430-31.
119. Id. at 431.
120. Id. at 432.
121. Id.
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President's cancellation of § 968 eliminated a statutory bargaining chip."' Third,
the Snake River plaintiffs had actively prepared to take advantage of the provi-
sion canceled by the President and would have done so upon reversal of the can-
cellation.123 In sum, the majority stated that "[b]y depriving them of their statu-
tory bargaining chip, the cancellation inflicted a sufficient likelihood of econom-
ic injury to establish standing under our precedents."1 2' The majority also deter-
mined that the Snake River plaintiffs suffered an injury "at least as concrete" as
the one found in Bryant v. Yellen.
12
1
2. The Constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act
In the most important part of its decision, the majority held that the Line Item
Veto Act was unconstitutional. The majority determined that both of President
Clinton's cancellations had the effect of amending two statutes by eliminating a
section of each, which in the majority's view was a clear violation the express
language of the Presentment Clause and the Court's holding in Chadha 28 In
making this determination, Justice Stevens stressed the important difference
between the President's "return" of a bill, stipulated in Article I, and the power of
"cancellation" under the Line Item Veto Act. 2" Justice Stevens stated that "[t]he
constitutional return takes place before the bill becomes a law; the statutory can-
cellation occurs after the bill becomes a law. The constitutional return is of the
entire bill; the statutory cancellation is of only a part." '
The government proposed two arguments in support of its position that the
President's use of the cancellation power provided in the Act did not violate
Article I of the Constitution. 9 First, the government contended that the
President only exercised discretionary authority, granted to him by Congress, by
using the veto. 3' Second, the government contended that the President's cancel-
lation power equaled the authority to decline the implementation of tax measures
or the spending of specified amounts of money, such as was discussed in
Clark. '3 The majority rejected these arguments, however, and Justice Stevens
countered saying, "whenever the President cancels an item of new direct spend-
ing or a limited tax benefit he is rejecting the policy judgment made by Congress





125. Id. at 433.
126. Id. at 438.
127. Id. at 439.
128. Id.
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Congress itself made the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions
at issue upon the occurrence of particular events subsequent to enactment, and it
left only the determination of whether such events occurred up to the President.
The Line Item Veto Act authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of
laws, for his own policy reasons without observing the procedures set out in
Article I, § 7.13
The majority expressed further displeasure with the Act because of the unilat-
eral power it gave to the President to alter legislation; 34 however, they declined to
consider the district court's holding that the Act violated the separation of pow-
ers. 3' As a final point, Justice Stevens stressed that the majority's opinion rested
on the "narrow ground" that Article I does not authorize the provisions of the
Line Item Veto Act,1 36 and that Congress must amend the Constitution via Article
V if it wants to change the President's role in enacting laws. 3'
B. Justice Kennedy ' Concurrence
Justice Kennedy agreed completely with the reasons given by Justice Stevens
for holding the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional." His concurring opinion
served as a response to and an expression of disagreement with a statement made
in Justice Breyer's dissent. In his dissent, Justice Breyer stated that the Act did
not threaten individual liberties." Justice Kennedy believed that the Act disrupt-
ed the separation of powers and noted that personal liberty is at stake any time
one branch of government attempts to violate the separation of powers."'4
Justice Kennedy wrote that the Act created a new process by which the
President could hurt one group in order to disfavor that group or to extract fur-
ther concessions from Congress, thereby increasing presidential power beyond
what the Framers intended."' In his opinion, the fact that Congress voluntarily
granted its authority to the President created no justification for the Act.12
Rather, "[b]y increasing the power of the President beyond what the Framers
envisioned, the statute compromis[ed] the political liberty of [the] citizens, liber-
ty which the separation of powers [sought] to secure.""
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C. Justice Scalia s Concurrence in Part and Dissent in Part
(joined by 0 'Connor and Breyer, JJ, as to Part III)
1. Standing
In Part II of his opinion, Justice Scalia discussed his finding that the Snake
River plaintiffs lacked standing. He discounted the majority's view that the
Snake River plaintiffs had suffered an injury in that the veto deprived them of a
statutory bargaining chip. Justice Scalia stated, "I know of no case outside the
equal protection field in which the mere detriment to one's 'bargaining position,'
as opposed to a demonstrated loss of some bargain, has been held to confer
standing."'' Justice Scalia found no evidence to support Snake River's con-
tention that it actually engaged in bargaining that was hampered by the
President's veto." ' He likened the Court's holding in Simon and Allen to the
injury asserted by Snake River, explaining that "it is purely speculative whether a
tax-deferral would have prompted any sale [to Snake River]."' Distinguishing
the Bryant case, Justice Scalia found no reason to believe that financing would
be available for Snake River to purchase any processing facilities. He also found
no evidence that the processors in question would have been sold absent the
President's cancellation, and said that Bryant represented a "crabbed view" of the
standing doctrine." 7  In Justice Scalia's view, the Snake River plaintiffs did not
establish an injury in fact, and consequently, the Court should not have addressed
the merits of their claim. 1"
2. Constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act
In Part III of his opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the New
York plaintiffs had standing but asserted his belief that the President's exercise of
the line item veto did not violate the Constitution." 9 He pointed out that, in his
view, the President used his line item veto power only after the Presentment
Clause had been satisfied with the passage of the Balanced Budget Act.'
Justice Scalia remarked that "the Court's problem with the Act is not that it
authorizes the President to veto parts of a bill.., but rather that it authorizes him
to 'cancel'-prevent from 'having legal force or effect'---certain parts of duly
enacted statutes.''
Justice Scalia wrote that the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority, not the Presentment Clause, was the real issue the Court faced with
the Line Item Veto Act.' 2 In sum, Justice Scalia contended that if the Line Item
Veto Act had authorized the President to "decline to spend," similar to the legis-
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lation considered in Clark and Bowsher, such an authorization would surely have
been constitutional." The Line Item Veto Act gave the President authority to
"cancel," but according to Justice Scalia, this was a technical difference not relat-
ed to the Presentment Clause."' With regard to the doctrine of unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority, Justice Scalia believed that the real issue pre-
sented by the case was not a doctrine of technicalities, 5 ' and that the title of the
Line Item Veto Act had succeeded in "faking out the Supreme Court."'5" In clos-
ing his opinion, Justice Scalia opined that "[t]he President's action ... is not a
line item veto and thus does not offend Article 1, [section] 7. s1"
D. Justice Breyer s Dissent (oined by O'Connor and Scalia, JJ, as to Part III)
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority's view that both groups of plaintiffs
had standing. He did not, however, think that the Act violated the text of Article
I or the separation of powers.'58
1. Constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act
Justice Breyer, in Section III of his dissent, criticized the majority for using a
"purely literal analysis" to deal with the case.' He believed that the President's
literal action was not to repeal or amend anything, but was, rather, an execution
of power given to him by Congress through a law that was enacted in strict com-
pliance with the Constitution.'6 He likened this delegation of power to the power
of choosing one legal path instead of another, such as the power to appoint. 6
Justice Breyer felt that the government had a valid argument in that the Act did
not grant the President actual power to cancel a line item expenditure, even
though the Act's key verb was "cancel." '62 Justice Breyer reasoned that the Act
contained a "lockbox" provision giving legal significance to a particular statuto-
ry appropriation even if, and even after, the President had canceled it.'63 To
Justice Breyer, the Act only delegated the power to decide how to spend the
money designated for an appropriation, whether for that appropriation's specific
purpose, or for general deficit reduction under the "lockbox" provision.'6
Justice Breyer found that
153. Id. at 455-56.
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[b]ecause one cannot say that the President's exercise of the power the Act
grants is, literally speaking, a 'repeal' or 'amendment,' the fact that the Act's
procedures differ from the Constitution's exclusive procedures for enacting (or
repealing) legislation is beside the point. The Act itself was enacted in accor-
dance with these procedures, and its failure to require the President to satisfy
those procedures does not make the Act unconstitutional.16
2. Separation of Powers
Justice Breyer dealt with the separation of powers issue in Part IV of his dis-
sent. This section centered on Congress' delegation of legislative power to the
Executive. He stated that a finding of a separation of powers violation must be
based upon an important conflict between the Act and a significant objective of
the separation of powers. He reasoned specifically that the Act achieved no vio-
lation of Congressional power since Congress, in the Line Item Veto Act,
retained the power to insert into any piece of an appropriations statute a provi-
sion saying that the Act would not apply, 6' and, further, that Congress retained
the power to "'disapprov[e]' and thereby reinstate any of the President's cancella-
tions." 67
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Breyer did not feel that the President's power to pre-
vent spending items from taking effect, granted by Congress in the Act, violated
the "nondelegation doctrine."1 He noted that the Act was "limited to one area of
[g]overnment, the budget, and it [sought] to give the President the power, in one
portion of that budget, to tailor spending and special tax relief to what he con-
clude[d were] the demands of fiscal responsibility.'"6 9 Breyer further concluded
that the Act posed no serious risk of "arbitrary Presidential decision making."'7 0
V ANALYSIS
With its decision in Clinton v. New York, "' it is obvious that a majority of the
Supreme Court believed that the line item veto seriously threatened and under-
mined time honored and constitutionally mandated principles of making and
enacting laws. Traditionally, the Court often prefers to take other available
avenues in denying judicial legitimacy to acts of Congress that it considers con-
stitutionally impermissible, rather than declaring them wholly unconstitutional.
As such, the Court's decision sent a clear message of finality for any future use
of the line item veto.
In order to render its decision, the majority first determined that both groups of
plaintiffs in the case had standing under the Constitution to challenge the Line
Item Veto Act. With regard to the New York plaintiffs, this positive determina-
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tion by the majority was not disputed, as is evidenced by the dissenters' agree-
ment. Though Justice Scalia argued strongly against granting standing to the
Snake River plaintiffs, the majority made a more viable argument in favor of
standing, which is true for two reasons: (1) because Snake River suffered a nar-
row, personal, and future affecting injury and (2) because of the precedental
weight of the Court's grant of standing in Bryant v. Yellen."
In declaring the Act unconstitutional, the majority relied on a strict interpreta-
tion, or literal textual reading, of the Presentment Clause found in Article I.
Simply put, the majority believed that the use of the line item veto was a proce-
dure that directly violated the express intent of the Constitution's framers for the
enactment of legislation.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia, straying somewhat from his usual strict construc-
tionist approach, presented a very creative argument for the constitutionality of
the line item veto by stressing that the President's act of cancellation would only
occur after satisfaction of the Presentment Clause. With this argument, Scalia
tried to shift the focus away from whether the wording of the Constitution was
complied with, to whether there was, in fact, a proper delegation of authority-
the power to cancel a provision in an enacted statute-from Congress to the
President. Viewed narrowly, Justice Scalia's argument is enticing; however, when
viewed broadly, the real issue to be contemplated is whether the President's use
of the line item veto has a direct effect, be it positive or negative, on the process
by which acts of Congress are enacted into law and whether this effect is autho-
rized, i.e., spelled out, by the language of the Constitution. For the majority, it
had a negative and unconstitutional impact on the law making process.
The most intriguing point of Justice Scalia's dissent, and possibly of the entire
opinion, is that the Supreme Court was "faked out" by the title and wording of
the Line Item Veto Act. It is certainly reasonable to believe that had the Act used
the phrase "decline to spend," rather than "cancel," it could have passed constitu-
tional muster. As one author stated,
according to the actual language of the Act, the President's line item "veto" does
not prevent the cancelled provisions from ever becoming law. It rescinds them.
It terminates or nullifies the legal effect that they obtained when he signed the
bill into law . . . . [I]t would follow that Congress could constitutionally pass a
new line item veto act tomorrow. The new act could be identical to the old one
in every substantive respect, so long as it had a new name, expressly stated that
the signed bill shall be law, called for the publication of the entire signed bill in
the United States Code-and provided that the President may nonetheless "ter-
minate" (or "suspend") certain of the bill's provisions through the designated
cancellation process.
7 3
Perhaps, then, the Act, through its wording, caused its own death.
Opponents of the line item veto advocate three major critiques of the line item
veto, which legitimize the Court's decision in Clinton. First, the line item veto in
172. See Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1984).
173. Powell & Rubenfield, supra note 114, at 1181.
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effect shifts the "power of the purse," which is safer in the hands of a representa-
tive body, to a centralized executive. Second, the line item veto allows the
President to unilaterally carry out his own agenda. Third, the line item veto cre-
ates a legislative/executive "quid pro quo." For example, a legislator might
promise to support a Presidential nominee to the Supreme Court in return for the
assurance that the millions of dollars in highway repair funds designated for that
legislator's state will not be lined out of an appropriations bill."'
The chief argument in favor of the line item veto is that it would provide the
President with a way to prevent excessive spending. However, this argument is
not substantial enough, nor is the need great enough, to justify a change in the
constitutionally mandated procedures on which we have always relied for the
promulgation of the laws that govern, provide for, and protect us.
The paramount principle that emanates from the Court's holding in Clinton is
that the time honored institution of constitutional law making and enactment is
not to be disturbed, at least not without a specific amendment to the Constitution.
Obviously, if Congress wants in the future to provide the President with a greater
check on congressional spending, without fear of its being struck down, it will
have to find a new way. Possibly, that new way could be taken from an old sug-
gestion. ' Congress could start sending the President a separate bill for every
individual item of spending it passes each year. This process, along with the
President's decision to sign or veto each bill, would certainly comport with the
Presentment Clause, but in this day and age, such a practice is seemingly irra-
tional and would prove to be untimely.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to preserve the true character of the Presentment Clause, the Supreme
Court had no choice but to declare the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional. In
light of this decision, Congress, as well as the general public, should take heed
that today's Court is satisfied with the President's role in enacting legislation as it
is expressed in the Constitution. Furthermore, as written by Senator Robert
Byrd,
there is still a lesson that the item veto experience should teach us; namely, to
beware of quick fixes to perceived institutional problems. The institutional
machinery devised by the Framers can be inefficient and frustrating, but there is
much wisdom in its design. By tinkering so cavalierly with a system that was
produced through diligence and careful consideration, we run the risk of throw-
ing the entire constitutional apparatus into disarray. If we are to take upon our-
selves the awesome responsibility of improving upon the Framers' work-as we
must, from time to time-we should at least accompany our efforts with the
same degree of hard work and serious thought that the Constitution memorial-
izes.""
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